PCAOB Monitoring and the Information Uncertainty Associated with Fair Value Estimates by Strawser, William et al.
   
PCAOB Monitoring and the Information Uncertainty Associated with Fair Value 
Estimates 
 
 
Abstract  
We study the role of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) as a monitor in 
mitigating uncertainty surrounding fair value estimates. Specifically, we examine whether the 
issuance of a PCAOB inspection report with fair value deficiencies (FV deficient inspection 
reports) is associated with a reduction of the information uncertainty associated with fair value 
estimates in clients’ financial statements. We find a reduction in the information uncertainty (as 
proxied by implied asset-specific betas related to fair value disclosures) after the issuance of a 
FV deficient inspection report. This result is driven by a subsample of issuer clients that face 
greater exposure to fair value assets. In sensitivity analysis, we find evidence of greater audit 
effort (increased audit fees, and decreased transfers into level three fair value assets) and 
increased disclosure in the fair value footnote (increased number of words and number of 
asset/liability categories) after a FV deficient report, suggesting that auditors increase effort and 
scrutiny directed at fair value holdings. Our findings are incremental to the effects produced by 
SEC comment letters that discuss fair value issues. Overall, our evidence suggests that the 
PCAOB inspection process plays a role in mitigating opacity issues related to fair value.  
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1 Introduction 
Fair value estimates continue as a cause of concern for regulators, auditors and investors. 
While the number of audit deficiencies has decreased over time, as measured by Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB or Board) inspection reports, the number of fair 
value estimate and impairment deficiencies has not (Glover, Taylor and Wuf 2017; Value 
Research Corporation (VRC) 2013). According to interviews and evidence gathered by Glover et 
al. (2017), professional auditors assert that the PCAOB expects what, in some cases, may not be 
deliverable: positive assurance that fair value estimates are not materially misstated. Based on 
the difficulties experienced by auditors and documented by fair value deficiencies in PCAOB 
inspection reports, financial statement users are left with little assurance that point estimates of 
fair value, which are sometimes based on subjective and unobservable inputs supplied by 
management, are reliable indicators to establish the valuation parameters of fair value assets. 
Hence, while high-quality disclosures contained in audited financial reports are meant to reduce 
information asymmetry and information risk in general, it is an empirical question whether the 
current audit standards or processes used to provide positive assurance for some complex fair 
value estimates result in high-quality disclosures given the inherent opacity surrounding these 
estimates. 
This paper examines whether fair value deficiencies highlighted in PCAOB inspection 
reports serve as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate the information uncertainty associated with 
fair value estimates. If PCAOB-reported fair value deficiencies reveal weak links in the work of 
auditors, and auditors respond in kind with increased vigilance over the audit process of fair 
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value estimates for their issuer clients, then we would anticipate measures of information 
uncertainty associated with fair value estimates to be mitigated after the release of an inspection 
report. 
In its auditing standards (PCAOB AS 2502), the PCAOB lists several factors that may 
lead to uncertainty in the reliability of fair value measurements.1 Lambert, Leuz and Verrechia 
(2007) demonstrate that higher quality disclosures result in lower implied betas and cost of 
capital. Therefore, we predict that audit firms that receive PCAOB inspection reports with fair 
value deficiencies (hereafter “FV deficient inspection reports”) will increase scrutiny and testing 
of their issuer clients’ fair value estimates, which will increase disclosure quality and reduce 
information risk. In particular, we use the three-tier classification system prescribed by Statement 
of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157 (SFAS 157) to determine whether the implied betas 
of fair value assets classified as level 2 or level 3 decrease for issuer clients of audit firms that 
have received an inspection report containing a fair value deficiency.  
Using a methodology developed by Riedl and Serafeim (2011), we measure asset-specific 
implied betas for level 1, level 2 and level 3 assets recorded in the client financial statements in 
the years following the issuance of a FV deficient inspection report. We find that the implied 
betas associated with level 2 and level 3 fair value estimates of financial assets are negatively 
associated with the issuance of a FV deficient inspection report. We also find that this result is 
driven by a subsample of issuer clients that face high exposure to level 2 and level 3 assets.  
We conduct several sensitivity tests. First, we investigate changes in audit effort after the 
issuance of a FV deficient report. We find audit fees increase and net transfers into level 3 
                                                 
1 These include “The length of the forecast period; The number of significant and complex assumptions associated 
with the process; A higher degree of subjectivity associated with the assumptions and factors used in the process;  
A higher degree of uncertainty associated with the future occurrence or outcome of events underlying the 
assumptions used; Lack of objective data when highly subjective factors are used.” AS 2502 .24. 
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decrease after the issuance of a FV deficient report, suggesting increased audit effort in response 
to a deficient report.2 Second, we hand collect fair value disclosures from the footnotes of annual 
reports to investigate changes in disclosure after the issuance of a FV deficient report. We find 
increased word count in the fair value footnote and increased segregation of categories of fair 
value assets and liabilities, suggesting enhanced disclosure in response to a FV deficient report. 
Third, we demonstrate that our findings are incremental to those documented by Bens, Cheng 
and Neamtiu (2016) who find evidence consistent with a reduction in information asymmetry 
after the issuance of a SEC comment letter related to fair value. Fourth, to mitigate concerns that 
our results are due to an omitted variable that is correlated to the issuance of a PCAOB 
inspection report, we examine the market response to the release of the inspection report prior to 
when the auditor has an opportunity to improve effort and scrutiny directed to level 2 and level 3 
fair value assets. We find that information uncertainty increases in the quarter after the issuance 
of the PCAOB inspection report. This suggests that the report may temporarily increase 
information uncertainty before the auditor has an opportunity to intervene.  We also provide 
evidence showing that the reduction in information uncertainty after the inspection event is not 
explained by issuer clients selling off difficult to value fair value assets after an inspection event. 
Lastly, our results are robust to alternative measures of PCAOB deficiencies and information 
uncertainty.  
Our research contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we show PCAOB 
inspections serve as a monitoring mechanism to mitigate information uncertainty for fair value 
assets through the communication of deficiencies in the inspection report. Prior literature finds 
                                                 
2 Studies have suggested that managerial opportunism may inject bias in the classification decisions between level 2 
and 3 estimated assets. Hence, Botosan, Carrizosa and Huffman (2011) and Bens, Cheng and Neamtiu (2016) 
combine level 2 and level 3 estimates in operationalizing tests of hypotheses. Our study provides results for these 
estimates combined and separated. 
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diminished value relevance (Song, Thomas and Yi 2010) and higher information uncertainty 
(Riedl and Serafeim 2011) associated with fair value assets designated as level 2 and level 3. In 
addition, prior research suggests that variation in opacity across fair value designations is 
mitigated by regulatory intervention by the SEC compliance process (Bens, Cheng and Neamtiu 
2016). We find information uncertainty associated with level 2 and, in certain specifications, 
level 3 fair value assets, is lower following the release of a FV deficient inspection report. 
Therefore, we document an additional mechanism – the PCAOB inspection process – by which 
the opacity issues related to fair value assets are mitigated.  
Second, we contribute to growing literature that examines the auditor’s role in evaluating 
and providing positive assurance for fair value estimates. Prior literature on fair value 
demonstrates the difficulties encountered by auditors in evaluating the estimates of complex fair 
value assets (e.g., Bedard and Canon 2017). These difficulties include managers’ and auditors’ 
lack of expertise in valuation methodologies (Griffith et al. 2014), the lack of clear guidance in 
current audit standards that govern the audit of fair value estimates (Glover et al. 2017), and the 
underlying volatility of model inputs that may change rapidly in the face of shifting 
environmental conditions (Christensen et al. 2012). Whether auditors can provide positive 
assurance for certain highly-complex fair value instruments is an open question. Our evidence is 
consistent with auditors mitigating the risk of uncertainty surrounding fair value estimates.  
Third, we contribute to the literature on whether the content of PCAOB inspection reports 
improves financial reporting quality. Prior literature examines the association between the 
existence and number of deficiencies in PCAOB inspection reports and audit quality (Lennox 
and Pittman 2010; DeFond and Lennox 2011; Gipper, Leuz, and Maffett 2015; Lamoreaux 
2016). More recent studies examine the association between the content of PCAOB inspection 
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reports and audit quality (Acito et al. 2017; Defond and Lennox 2017). Defond and Lennox 
(2017) find that PCAOB inspections related to internal control deficiencies improve the quality 
of internal control audits. Acito et al. (2017) find higher exposure by issuer clients to deficient 
standards leads to increased audit fees and more auditor turnover. We find PCAOB inspections 
related to fair value deficiencies improve financial reporting quality by reducing information 
uncertainty surrounding fair value assets, making our study one of the first to examine the 
financial reporting implications of PCAOB inspection reports. 
Our study proceeds as follows. Section 2 explores background information regarding fair 
values and the PCAOB inspection process as well as prior related literature. Section 3 motivates 
and develops hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the research method and sample description. 
Section 5 provides an analysis and discussion of results. Section 5 offers preliminary sensitivity 
analysis and Section 7 concludes. 
2 Background Information 
2.1 Fair Value Estimates and Reporting under SFAS 157 
 The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued SFAS 157 in 2006, allowing 
adoption of the standard beginning in 2007 and requiring adoption for fiscal years ending after 
November 15, 2007. This standard defines fair value as “the price that would be received to sell 
an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the 
measurement date.” The standard also introduces a three-tier classification system to distinguish 
between fair value estimates that were determined by management through procedures of 
varying objectivity. In particular, level 1 inputs are those estimates derived from quotable prices 
in active markets for assets and liabilities that are identical to the asset or liability being 
measured. Level 2 inputs represent estimates derived from observable quoted prices of identical 
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assets and liabilities in inactive markets, or similar assets and liabilities in active markets, as well 
as inputs other than quoted prices that are observable and related to the value of the asset (e.g., 
yield curves, price indices or exchange rates). Hence, level 2 estimates may lack the precision of 
level 1 estimates due to illiquid markets or volatile inputs that may increase the variance of the 
estimate itself under shifting economic trends. Level 3 estimates (typically considered the most 
opaque) represent unobservable, management-supplied estimates and forecasts sometimes 
derived from valuation models and assumptions (e.g. forecasted home price depreciation and 
credit loss severity on mortgage-related positions), resulting in “mark-to-model” rather than 
mark-to-market valuations of assets and liabilities that are “largely undisciplined by market 
information” (Riedl and Serafeim 2011, pg. 1086). Because these estimates lack reliability and 
are largely subjective, expanded disclosures are required for level 3 estimates.   
2.2 PCAOB Inspection Reports and Audits of Fair Value Estimates 
The PCAOB is a nonprofit corporation created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to 
oversee the audits of public companies to further protect the interests of the investing 
community. A noteworthy way in which the Board executes this charge is by inspecting the audit 
and assurance processes of auditing firms that audit (or assist in the audit of) issuer companies 
around the world. Through these inspection reports, the PCAOB may highlight minor or 
significant concerns in the execution of an audit. The PCAOB focuses its inspection efforts at the 
engagement-level and reports its results (if any deficiencies are detected) at the audit-firm level.3 
It bases its inspection decisions on an internal risk-based model and inspects those engagements 
for which it believes the risk of audit failure is highest.4   
                                                 
3 The PCAOB does not publicly disclose which audit engagements it inspects.  
4 The PCAOB is studying the use of a random process (rather than risk-based) to select some engagements for 
inspection. (Ryan 2017).  
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One area given intense scrutiny by the PCAOB in recent years has been the audit 
processes surrounding the measurement and estimation of financial assets and liabilities that are 
reported at fair value on the balance sheets of corporations (VRC 2013). The PCAOB has three 
standards to guide the audit process of fair value estimates: AS 2501, Auditing Accounting 
Estimates; AS 2502, Auditing Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures; and AS 2503, Auditing 
Derivative Instruments, Hedging Activities and Investments in Securities Related to the Audit of 
Derivative Instruments. All of these standards predate the issuance of SFAS 157 and the creation 
of the current three-tier system of estimation. In addition, the PCAOB has issued six practice 
alerts since 2007 related to fair value assets and estimates, which arose in the environment of 
growing concern surrounding the audit of fair value instruments during the financial crisis.   
The relatively high frequency of fair value deficiencies (Glover et al. 2017), the 
perceived inconsistencies of current audit standards and the growing use of third-party specialists 
in determining fair value measurements led the PCAOB to issue Release No. 2017-002, 
Proposed Auditing Standard –Auditing Accounting Estimates, Including Fair Value 
Measurements and Proposed Amendments to PCAOB Auditing Standards. While the feedback 
regarding the formation of a new standard or the potential modification of existing standards has 
been mostly positive, audit firms continue to express concern that the PCAOB recognize the 
inherent subjectivity and imprecision associated with auditing complex fair value estimates. 
3 Hypothesis Development 
It is possible that PCAOB inspection reports do not reduce information uncertainty 
associated with disclosures of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets. Glover et al. (2017) and 
Christensen et al. (2012) cast doubt on whether auditors will be able to meet the current 
expectations of precision held by regulators and reflected in inspection report deficiencies. For 
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example, Christensen et al. (2012, p. 143) state “No amount of auditing can remove the extreme 
uncertainty inherent in reported values derived from management’s valuation models based on 
unobservable inputs subject to estimation uncertainty.”5 Given the subjective and unobservable 
nature of certain fair value inputs and estimates, increased testing and scrutiny by auditors may 
not result in reducing information uncertainty associated with fair value assets or all fair value 
assets equally.  
However, substantial empirical evidence suggests that the PCAOB inspection process can 
result in financial reporting quality improvements. For example, Carcello, Hollingsworth and 
Mastriola (2011) document that inspection reports tied to Big 4 auditors lead to decreased 
discretionary accruals in future periods. DeFond and Lennox (2017) find that internal control 
deficiencies in the PCAOB inspection report lead to higher quality internal control audit reports, 
while Acito et al. (2017) finds higher exposure by issuer clients to deficient standards mentioned 
in the PCAOB report leads to increased auditor turnover. Further, DeFond and Lennox (2017) 
and Acito et al. (2017) provide evidence that audit fees increase after the issuance of deficient 
inspection reports, suggesting increased efforts in response to problematic areas documented in 
these reports. Using the staggered introduction of the inspection process as a natural experiment, 
Gipper, Leuz, and Maffett (2015) show that market reaction to unexpected earnings increases for 
issuers affected by the new PCAOB inspection regime, compared to a control sample not so 
affected.  In a qualitative study using questionnaires and interview techniques, Westermann, 
                                                 
5 Christensen et al. (2012) demonstrate how small and defensible adjustments to model inputs can result in changes 
to estimates that exceed the threshold of audit materiality. In one example, the authors highlight that a change of 25 
basis points in General Motor’s 2002 discount rate increases 2003 pretax net income by $120 million, reduces 2002 
pension obligation by $1.8 billion and 2002 equity by $1.1 billion while the audit materiality was estimated at $104 
million. 
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Cohen and Trompeter (2018) show that auditors and audit firms change their behavior in reaction 
to Part I findings received from the PCAOB. 
Further empirical evidence comes from Aobdia (2018). Using proprietary PCAOB data, 
Aobdia (2018) shows that audit firms receiving deficient PCAOB inspection reports react by 
increasing effort (measured by audit hours) on both the inspected engagement and non-inspected 
engagements both within the office of the inspected engagement and the firm’s other offices. 
This suggests that issuer clients of the audit firm as a whole may benefit from the spill-over 
effects of a deficiency in the PCAOB inspection report even if the deficiency did not occur on 
the client’s audit engagement.  
Overall, the potential for improvements in the level of effort and scrutiny directed to level 
2 and level 3 holdings after the inspection event suggests monitoring by the PCAOB may be an 
effective tool in enhancing the disclosure of fair value estimates. Audit firms that receive FV 
deficient inspection reports will likely increase scrutiny and testing of their issuer clients, which 
could lead to an increase in disclosure quality and a reduction in information risk of level 2 and 
level 3 fair value estimates. This leads to our hypothesis: 
H1: Information risk associated with level 2 and level 3 fair value asset holdings will 
decrease in the fiscal year of a fair value deficient inspection. 
 
4 Research Method  
 We measure information uncertainty (risk) in the spirit of Lambert, Leuz and Verrechia 
(2007) who derive a model establishing the presence of undiversifiable information risk. They 
argue that this risk arises from two sources: (1) directly from investors’ assessments of the 
covariance of the firm’s future cash flows with those of other firms and (2) from operational and 
investment decisions arising from higher quality information that change the expected value and 
covariance of cash flows with other firms. Lambert et al. (2007) provide evidence that increases 
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in the quality of information or disclosures can directly impact the assessed covariance of cash 
flows and alter the cost of capital for the firm and that this effect may be captured in a firm’s 
market beta. To the degree that FV deficient inspection reports increase auditor vigilance over 
client processes and estimates, increased efficiency in processes and valuations of complex 
estimates should reduce information risk in these estimates. 
To study whether FV deficient inspection reports yield significant changes in the 
information uncertainty for level 2 and level 3 fair value estimates, we adopt a methodology used 
by Riedl and Serafeim (2011) that examines asset-specific betas of fair value assets—a proxy for 
information uncertainty—for issuer clients before and after the issuance of an inspection report 
to the auditor. Because full audit processes are unlikely to be performed on interim financial 
statements, we select data from the first annual report after the issuance of a FV deficient 
inspection report to measure variables in testing for the effects of reduced information 
uncertainty.  
 Riedl and Serafeim (2011) derive asset-specific betas through manipulations of the 
balance sheet identity (A=L+E). First, they decompose assets into level 1, level 2, level 3 
designations and assets not measured at fair value (A = FVA1 + FVA2 + FVA3 + NFVA) and 
substitute this into the balance sheet identity. They then divide through by total assets to provide 
the following derivation of a weighted-average beta for each firm: 
 𝛽𝐴1
𝐹𝑉𝐴1
𝐴
+ 𝛽𝐴2
𝐹𝑉𝐴2
𝐴
+ 𝛽𝐴3
𝐹𝑉𝐴3
𝐴
+ 𝛽𝑂𝐴
𝑁𝐹𝑉𝐴
𝐴
= 𝛽𝐿
𝐿𝐸𝑉
𝐴
+ 𝛽𝐸
𝐸
𝐴
 
            (1) 
 Where: 
 FVA1, FVA2, FVA3 = fair value of assets designated at levels 1, 2 and 3; 
NFVA = other assets not measured at fair value; 
A = total assets; 
 LEV = total liabilities; and 
 E = book value of total equity. 
 
11 
 
Rearranging to solve for equity beta yields: 
 𝛽𝐸
𝐸
𝐴
= 𝛽𝐴1
𝐹𝑉𝐴1
𝐴
+ 𝛽𝐴2
𝐹𝑉𝐴2
𝐴
+ 𝛽𝐴3
𝐹𝑉𝐴3
𝐴
+ 𝛽𝑂𝐴
𝑁𝐹𝑉𝐴
𝐴
− 𝛽𝐿
𝐿𝐸𝑉
𝐴
 
            (2) 
 
Riedl and Serafeim (2011) test this model in their primary analysis to determine whether 
information uncertainty increases over the designation of fair value estimate levels 1, 2 and 3. 
We modify their approach to determine whether inspections yield a moderating influence on 
information uncertainty by estimating the following regression framework for all issuers in our 
sample: 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎_𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 = (𝛼1𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡) + 𝐹𝑉𝐷𝐸𝐹
+  𝐹𝑉𝐷𝐸𝐹 × (𝛼1𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼4𝑁𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖 
 
(3) 
BETA_ADJ is each firm’s equity beta, assessed over the three months following the 
public release of its annual report for year t, multiplied by the ratio of the firm’s book value of 
equity to total assets. FVDEF represents the intensity of fair value deficiencies in a PCAOB 
inspection report and is calculated as the ratio of issuers receiving a fair value deficiency to the 
total number of deficient issuers listed in the report.6 We ensure that the issue date of the FV 
deficient inspection report occurs before the fiscal year-end to allow for improvements to 
controls, audit procedures or other potential deficiencies in the disclosure practices of the audit 
firm’s issuer clients.7 All other variables are as defined in the appendix. 
 As previously mentioned, we assess equity beta by the single-factor CAPM model: 
                                                 
6 We also construct an alternate version of this variable, measuring the number of fair value deficiencies in an 
inspection report to the total number of deficiencies in an inspection report, but due to the subjectivity in 
determining the number of individual deficiencies, we chose to report the less granular measure of the intensity of 
fair value deficiencies. Irrespective, our calculation of the ratio of number of deficiencies to total deficiencies was 
highly correlated to FVDEF and yielded similar results. 
7 We use the public issue date of the inspection report similar to Defond and Lennox (2017). To the extent that the 
audit firm learns information about fair value estimate deficiencies prior to the public release of this report, choosing 
this date biases against our results. We also run (untabulated) models using the “end of inspection” date which 
occurs prior to the issue date of the report, to create our INSPECT variable with similar results.  
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 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑉𝑊_𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝑡 (4) 
We assess beta using daily-return data beginning three months after the fiscal year-end to ensure 
that financial information is publicly available. Fair value measures (FVA1, FVA2 and FVA3) 
capture market values yet are reported as book values on the balance sheets of issuer clients. To 
remain consistent, we use book values to capture total equity, total assets, total liabilities and the 
value of other assets not measured at fair value. If equity beta is the linear combination of 
weighted betas, we anticipate 1, 2, 3, and 4 from equation (3) to be positive and 5 to be 
negative, in line with equation (2). The empirical estimates of these regression coefficients are 
the implied betas based on the distribution parameters of the market value of equity and the 
audited fair value of assets that management reports (Riedl and Serafeim 2011).  
In line with prior studies (Riedl and Serafeim 2011; Song et al. 2010), we anticipate 1  
2  3 owing to the increased uncertainty associated with level 2 and level 3 asset disclosures, 
although we do not formally test this. Hypothesis 1 tests whether 2a < 0 and 3a < 0, which 
would suggest that fair value deficiencies noted in PCAOB inspection reports result in reductions 
in the association of information uncertainty with level 2 and level 3 assets. Because level 1 fair 
value estimates are based on readily available price quotes from active markets, we do not 
anticipate that inspection deficiencies will bring improvements to the evaluation and general 
audit processes involved with level 1estimates; hence, we make no prediction for 1a. 
 Similar to Bens et al. (2016), we also test a modified version of this model where FVA2 
and FVA3—the ratio of fair value assets estimated by level 2 and level 3 inputs, respectively—
are combined into a single variable FVA23. Botosan, Carrizosa and Huffman (2011) argue that 
designations of level 2 and level 3 assets may result from strategic considerations outside of the 
original intent of SFAS No. 157. Kohlbeck, Smith and Valencia (2017) also provide evidence 
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that auditors may curb their clients’ reclassification of assets as level 3 assets, especially when 
such transfers are regarded as managerially opportunistic. Finally, prior research (e.g. Chircop 
and Novotny-Farkas 2016) suggests the presence of a “return to liquidity” effect, wherein certain 
financial assets that suffered from severe market illiquidity stemming from the financial crisis 
were eventually reclassified as level 2 or level 1 assets once the crisis abated and markets 
became “orderly” again with increased liquidity. Regardless of the reason for reclassification, we 
perform this modification to ensure that transfers between level 2 and level 3 assets do not bias 
the results of our tests; hence, FVA23 equals the fair value of designated assets at levels 2 and 
level 3, scaled by total assets. 
 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎_𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡 = (𝛾1𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐹𝑉𝐴23𝑖𝑡) + 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇 +  𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇 × (𝛾1𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴23𝑖𝑡)
+ 𝛾3𝑁𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖 
 
(5) 
Both equations (4) and (5) include year fixed effects and audit firm fixed effects in line 
with Defond and Lennox (2017) with standard errors clustered at the bank-level. 
5  Sample Selection 
We use the Audit Analytics database to identify audit firms receiving a fair value 
deficient inspection report from the PCAOB. This results in 134 inspection reports for annually 
and triennially inspected audit firms that note fair value deficiencies during the fiscal years 2008-
2015. Once inspection reports of audit firms domiciled outside of the US are eliminated, we have 
a sample of 123 inspection reports remaining. We then form a sample of all issuers reporting 
non-zero level 2 or level 3 fair value assets during the sample years 2008-2015.8 Then, we 
restrict the sample to issuers in the financial services industry.9 From this, we pair each bank 
                                                 
8 To the extent the financial crisis influences our results, in sensitivity analysis we exclude observations from 2008 
and find that our main results are unaltered.  
9 This is consistent with prior literature (Riedl and Serafeim 2011) as financial service firms tend to face the most 
exposure to assets subject to fair value estimation techniques.  
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issuer-client with its audit firm and construct the FVDEF variable from inspection report data. 
We then pull all relevant financial information concerning fair value assets from the Compustat 
Bank file. After eliminating triennially inspected audit firm issuer clients, and deleting all 
observations without complete data from CRSP, Audit Analytics, and the FR-Y9C reports used 
to construct variables in our analyses, we have 1,493 issuer-years.10  
Table 1, Panel A details the sample selection procedure, while Panel B displays the 
frequency of FV deficient inspection reports released by the PCAOB on annually inspected audit 
firms in each year. We note that while annually inspected audit firms commonly receive fair 
value deficiencies in a given year, the construction of FVDEF contains variation because the 
proportion of issuer clients experiencing fair value deficiencies to the total issuer clients 
mentioned in an inspection report varies for each audit firm and from year-to-year.11 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Table 2, Panel A contains descriptive statistics for the full sample and the sample 
bifurcated between issuer clients of Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms.  All variables, except 
FVDEF, are winsorized at the first and 99th percentiles by fiscal year and by whether the issuer 
client employs a Big 4 or non-Big 4 auditor.12 Because the value of assets estimated at each level 
varies substantially, we report descriptive statistics for our three fair value variables—FVA1, 
FVA2 and FVA3— along with other variables in our main analysis in Panel A of Table 2.  
                                                 
10 We delete triennial firms for two reasons: (1) the relative dearth of observations arising from triennial inspections 
creates potential issues for statistical power, and (2) because triennial firms are inspected only once every three 
years, while annual firms are inspected each year, comparisons between the subsamples could be confounded by the 
failure to inspect at an equivalent frequency. 
11 In untabulated sensitivity analyses, we conduct our regression estimations based on other specifications, including  
the proportion of fair value deficiencies to total deficiencies in a given report, a 0/1 dichotomous variable that 
indicates the existence of a FV deficient report with any number of fair value deficiencies, and a count of the 
number of FV deficient inspection reports issued for a particular audit firm during the sample period. All definitions 
yield results similar to those reported in our multivariate analyses. 
12 Trimming at the first and 99th percentiles by this method results in no substantial alterations to the conclusions of 
our analysis. 
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[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Similar to prior studies, we document greater concentrations of level 2 estimates (18.2% 
of total assets for the full sample) than concentrations of either level 1 (0.8% of total assets) or 
level 3 estimates (0.4% of total assets). Panel B of Table 2 presents statistical tests of differences 
of means between Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firm issuer clients. Within the distinction of Big 4 
versus non-Big 4 audit firms, Big 4 issuer clients hold significantly more level 1 assets and level 
3 assets (0.6% less of level 1 assets to total assets and 0.2% less of level 3 assets to total assets) 
than do non-Big 4 audit firm issuer clients. The issuer clients of non-Big 4 audit firms have 
relatively less risk as proxied by BETA_ADJ than do issuer clients of Big 4 audit firms. Finally, 
significant differences in FVDEF indicate that FV deficient inspection reports of Big 4 audit 
firms tend to have greater proportions of issuer clients with identified FV deficiencies than do 
non-Big 4 audit firms. 
 Table 3 presents a correlation matrix for our main analysis variables and variables of note 
in subsequent sensitivity tests that support the main analysis. BETA_ADJ and FVA3 are 
positively and significantly associated according to both Spearman and Pearson coefficients, 
while BETA_ADJ and FVA1 are significantly and positively associated in Spearman coefficients. 
These results suggest that on a univariate basis, both level 3 and level 1 assets increase with 
equity-beta though likely for differing reasons;13 however, BETA_ADJ and FVA2 reveal no 
significant relationship. While the pattern of univariate associations exhibited by these 
coefficients suggests that level 3 and level 1 assets exhibit risk characteristics to a greater extent 
than do level 2 assets, these interpretations should be qualified as FVA1, FVA2 and FVA3 are 
each positively and significantly associated with each other. FVDEF, our construct representing 
                                                 
13 Specifically, level 3 likely contain increased information risk, while level 1 inputs, based on quoted market prices, 
likely reflect, in part, the covariance of the market beta. 
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the intensity of fair value deficiencies in an inspection report, is positively and significantly 
associated with FVA2, but not FVA1 and FVA3, perhaps owing to the greater proportion of FVA2 
assets owned by issuer clients. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
6 Multivariate Analysis  
Table 4, Panel A presents results from our main regression analysis with standard errors 
clustered by bank issuer-clients. Regression results are broken into four columns based on (1) 
whether FVA2 and FVA3 are regressed separately or in combination and (2) the fixed effects 
included in the model. In Panel A, Columns (1) and (3) we include estimation results with only 
year fixed effects to demonstrate the comparability of the estimated coefficients for our fair value 
asset main effects with those of Riedl and Serafeim (2011). Notably, in Column (1), the 
estimated coefficients for FVA1, FVA2 and FVA3 are all positive and significant 0.95, 1.068 and 
1.346 respectively.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
For the remainder of our results analysis, and in Columns (2) and (4), we include audit 
firm fixed effects in line with Defond and Lennox (2017) even though the inclusion of these 
additional controls distorts coefficient estimates for our main effects. Controlling for audit firm 
and year fixed effects together amounts to a difference-in-differences estimation with an on-
going treatment effect (DeFond and Lennox 2017). The results of all four columns generally 
support our hypothesis, documenting reductions in information uncertainty that increase in the 
intensity of fair value deficiencies contained in an inspection report.  
The estimated regression coefficient for the interaction term FVA2*FVDEF is negative 
and significant in both Columns (1) and (2), indicating that after a FV deficient inspection report 
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is issued, level 2 fair value assets exhibit a reduction in their association with BETA_ADJ, our 
proxy for information uncertainty. The estimated coefficient for FVA3*FVDEF is not significant 
in either Column (1) or Column (2). This finding may suggest that while PCAOB inspection 
reports containing fair value deficiencies are useful in reducing uncertainty for level 2 fair value 
assets, they may not necessarily improve the information content of level 3 fair value asset 
disclosures. The inability to reduce uncertainty surrounding level 3 fair value assets corroborates 
arguments expressed by Christensen et al. (2012) and anecdotal evidence reported by Glover et 
al. (2017) that estimates based on managerial inputs may simply be too subjective to effectively 
audit and report with elevated precision.  
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 disclose results when level 2 and level 3 fair value assets 
are combined in our regression model, and both estimations support our first hypothesis. The 
estimated coefficient for FVA23*FVDEF is negative and significant in both specifications, 
suggesting that fair value deficient inspection reports are effective in decreasing information 
uncertainty surrounding these estimates, even when controlling for transfers between level 2 and 
level 3 assets that may arise due to managerial opportunism, differences in audit quality or 
changes in market liquidity. 
The estimated regression coefficients for the control variables are significant and in the 
predicted direction. The coefficient of NFVA exhibits a positive and significant association with 
BETA_ADJ, and the LEV coefficient has a negative and significant association with BETA_ADJ. 
Consistent with Bens et al. (2016), we note that the estimated coefficients for FVA1*FVDEF are 
positive and significant. Although we make no formal prediction for this estimate, the positive 
coefficient suggests that fair value assets designated as level 1 exhibit an increased association 
with BETA_ADJ after the issuance of FV deficient inspection reports with higher proportions of 
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deficient issuers to total issuers. While this appears counterintuitive—since level 1 inputs are 
based on quoted prices in actively traded markets for identical assets and should be more 
transparent than level 2 or level 3 estimated assets—Bens et al. (2016) show similar results for 
level 1 assets after the issuance of a SEC comment letter, documenting that the association with 
level 1 assets and their proxies for information risk increase after the issuance of a comment 
letter.  
Results Partitioned by Exposure to Level 2 and Level 3 Assets 
Because auditor resources are limited, it stands to reason that auditors will react most 
strongly in the case of issuer clients that face greater exposure to the deficiencies contained in 
inspection reports. Specifically, in our setting, this corresponds to issuer clients that hold greater 
proportions of complex fair value assets. To further explore our primary result and provide 
corroboration that reductions in uncertainty are driven by audit firm efforts, resulting in changes 
of issuer client disclosure environments, we partition the sample by issuer client exposure to 
level 2 and level 3 assets. Specifically, we designate high risk exposure as those issuer clients 
who have greater than the median FVA23 by audit firm and fiscal year. We construct our 
partition in this manner to account for differences in the market share and issuer client profile of 
audit firms, understanding that certain audit firms likely have higher proportions of issuer clients 
with greater risk exposures to level 2 and level 3 assets than other audit firms. 
Panel B of Table 4 presents our regression results separated into high exposure versus 
low exposure issuer clients, again clustered by issuer and controlling for year and audit firm 
fixed effects. Overall, the results of the estimations suggest that reductions in information 
uncertainty are driven by changes in the information environment of issuer clients that face high 
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exposure to level 2 and level 3 assets. These findings are complementary to audit firms being 
most responsive to issuer clients that are particularly exposed to FV deficiencies. 
Columns (1) and (2) provide regression analyses between these subsamples when FVA2 
and FVA3 are separately estimated. Column (1) presents the regression results for issuers who 
rank above the median FVA23 exposure of their auditor. The estimated regression coefficient for 
FVA2*FVDEF is negative and significant, p<0.01. The low risk exposure subsample reported in 
Column (2) reveals a negative but insignificant coefficient for FVA2*FVDEF. 
Columns (3) and (4) provide estimations that combine level 2 and level 3 estimated assets 
for high exposure and low exposure issuer clients, respectively. When estimated in combination, 
the coefficient for FVA23*FVDEF is negative and significant for the high exposure subsamples 
(p<0.01) yet insignificant for the low exposure subsample. We also note that the counterintuitive 
result for the coefficient on the interaction of FVA1 and FVDEF in Panel A seems driven by 
issuer clients that rank in the low exposure subsamples.  
In sum, the results reported in Panel A and Panel B of Table 4 support a reduction in 
implied asset-specific betas for complex fair value estimates after FV deficient inspection reports 
are publicly issued. We take the reduction in these estimated coefficients as evidence that FV 
deficient inspection reports are associated with a reduction in information risk. Furthermore, 
results in Panel B suggest that the reduction of information risk is most notable for issuer clients 
that pose significant exposure risks for their audit firms, indicating that audit firms may make 
strategic decisions regarding scarce resources in addressing the deficiencies listed in inspection 
reports. Finally, when we combine level 2 and level 3 assets to reduce the bias of any 
opportunistic classification, we find consistent evidence of a reduction in the association of 
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BETA_ADJ with FVA23 that increases in the intensity of FV deficiencies contained in an 
inspection report. 
Overall, the tenor of our results provides evidence that the information environment 
surrounding complex fair value disclosures is enhanced with regard to investors’ interpretation of 
financial reports following the issue of a FV deficient inspection. We now turn sensitivity 
analyses, which underscore, in part, the role of the auditor in this process. 
7 Sensitivity Analyses 
7.1 PCAOB Deficiencies and Subsequent Audit Effort 
If improvements to information uncertainty result from increased auditor effort and focus, 
then we may detect changes in auditor effort or behavior after an inspection report. We explore 
shifts in auditor equilibrium on two dimensions: auditors’ deterrence of transfers into level 3 and 
increases in audit fees charged that are associated with complex fair value estimates after a FV 
deficient inspection reports. Prior research hypothesizes that transfers present a potential source 
of managerial opportunism (Botosan et al. 2011), as management may provide its own set of 
unobservable inputs to value them. Kohlbeck et al. (2017) corroborate this view, finding that 
high quality auditors reduce the amount of transfers into level 3 assets, especially when such 
transfers are likely to be a source of managerial opportunism. Consequently, we believe higher 
quality audit procedures in general should lead to reduced transfers into level 3 estimated assets. 
With respect to audit fees, Ettredge, Xu and Yi (2014) find that fair value estimate holdings 
increase the audit fees charged to issuer clients, while DeFond and Lennox (2017) provide 
evidence that audit effort increases after the issuance of an inspection report that expresses 
deficiencies over firms’ internal control weaknesses. Following these studies, to the extent 
deficient PCAOB inspection reports related to fair value spur auditors to conduct higher quality 
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audits with more rigorous testing of fair value assets (and the clients absorb those costs), we 
would expect transfers into level 3 assets to decrease and audit fees to increase. 
 To test for transfers into level 3 assets, we hand collect information from fair value 
footnotes regarding these transfers and estimate the following model, developed by Kohlbeck et 
al. (2017): 
𝐿𝑁_𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼1𝐹𝑉𝐷𝐸𝐹 + 𝛼2𝑁𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑉𝐴123𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝐶𝐻𝐺𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼5𝐿𝑁_𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼6𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼8𝑆𝐼𝐹𝐼 + 𝛼9𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖𝑡 
(6) 
 
LN_TRANSFERS equals the natural log of net transfers into level 3 if positive and zero 
otherwise. As the dependent variable is left-censored, we employ a tobit estimation method. 
Should FVDEF result in high quality audits and auditors’ increased vigilance over transfers into 
level 3 designations, we anticipate that 𝛼1 < 0.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 Consistent with our predictions, Table 5 reveals that the estimated coefficient on FVDEF 
is negative and significant. This suggests that auditors curtail transfers into level 3 designations 
following the issuance of an inspection report and that the curtailment is increasing in the 
proportion of fair value deficient issuers to total deficient issuers. We interpret this evidence as 
supportive of the role played by auditors in the shifting information environment following an 
inspection report. To the extent that higher quality audits tend to reduce the movement of fair 
value assets into level 3 (Kohlbeck et a. 2017), it appears that FV deficient inspection reports 
increase this tendency. We now explore the possibility of increased audit effort following FV 
deficient reports. 
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 To test for potential shifts in audit effort, we use an audit fee model designed for the 
banking industry, developed by Fields Fraser and Wilkins (2004) and used by Ettredge et al. 
(2014) in documenting that fair value asset holdings are positively associated with audit fees. We 
modify the model to analyze the auditor response to an inspection event as follows: 
𝐿𝑛𝐴𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = (𝛼1𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼4𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇
+  𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇 × (𝛼1𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼5𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼6𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼10𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼11𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐶𝐼𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑌
+ 𝛼12𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡+𝛼13𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀 + 𝛼14𝐶𝐻𝐺𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼15𝑀𝑇𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡+ 𝛼16𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼17𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼18𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼18𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖 
(7) 
 
Results from Ettredge et al. (2014) suggest that additional audit efforts are necessary to 
provide assurance for subjective fair value estimates. If FV deficient inspection reports result in 
increased audit efforts, specifically to fair value asset holdings that require verification of 
subjective and difficult-to-value estimates (i.e. level 2 and level 3), then we would anticipate that 
𝛼3𝑎 > 0 and 𝛼2𝑎 > 0. Though findings from Ettredge et al. (2014) suggest that level 3 estimated 
assets have a greater fee premium than do level 1 and level 2 assets, we allow for the possibility 
that level 2 asset premiums may rise after an inspection event. Because level 1 inputs are based 
on quoted market prices, which should—in theory—be easily verifiable, we make no prediction 
for 𝛼1𝑎 .  
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
Table 6 presents results from the estimation of our audit fee model for the full sample. 
Results in Column (1) reveal a positive and significant regression coefficient for FVA3*FVDEF. 
This suggests that after a FV deficient inspection reports is issued, the association of audit fees 
with level 3 fair value estimates increases. These results are in line with prior findings from 
Ettredge et al. (2014), who find that audit fee premiums for fair value assets are more positively 
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associated with level 3 fair value estimated assets than level 2 or level 1 fair value estimated 
assets. The coefficient of level 2 fair value assets is negative and insignificant. Examining these 
findings for audit fees in light of the transfer result of Table 5, it is possible that audit fees 
increase as do auditor efforts to deter transfers into level 3 assets (similar to findings in Kohlbeck 
et al. 2017). When level 2 and level 3 assets are combined, as in Column (2), the coefficient for 
the interaction term FVA23*FVDEF is negative and insignificant.  
7.2  PCAOB Deficiencies and Changes in Fair Value Footnote Disclosure  
We hand collect data about disclosures in the fair value footnote (number of words and 
asset and liability categories) to provide additional support for the “spillover” effects to issuers of 
increased monitoring by auditors after the issuance of a deficient FV report. Similar to Bens et al. 
(2016), we measure disclosure in the fair value footnote to provide evidence of increased 
disclosure practices after the issuance of a FV deficient inspection report. Table 7, Panel A, 
provides descriptive statistics for three measures of real changes to issuer client disclosures.  
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
Loughran and McDonald (2014) provide evidence that 10-K file size provides a simple 
and effective proxy for readability. As such, we collect LN_WORD which represents the natural 
log of the number of words in each issuer client’s fair value footnote disclosure. Next, we count 
the number of categories into which each issuer-client breaks its fair value asset and liability 
estimates measured on a recurring basis (ASSET_CAT and LIAB_CAT, respectively).  
Table 7, Panel B shows that following a FV deficient inspection report, average 
LN_COUNT increases (p<0.01), while the average ASSET_CAT and LIAB_CAT increase by 2.22 
and 0.43 categories, respectively (p<0.01). These results provide evidence of changes in the 
disclosure practices of issuer clients that corroborate the association of increased audit fees 
24 
 
following a deficient inspection report. Table 7, Panel C repeats this analysis with similar results 
but breaks the partition between those issuers with FVDEF greater than the median value and 
those with equal or lesser value of FVDEF. Overall, these results suggest that issuer clients 
change disclosures following FV deficient inspection reports and that these disclosure changes 
are particularly salient for clients of audit firms receiving inspection reports with a greater 
proportion of fair value deficient issuers to total issuers mentioned. 
7.3 PCAOB Inspections and SEC Comment Letters 
To provide evidence that our results are incremental to Bens et al. 2016, who find that 
proxies for risk decrease for banks that receive SEC comment letters related to FV, we partition 
our main analysis in Table 4, Panel A into subsamples based on whether the client received a 
FV-related SEC comment letter. We report the results of this analysis in Table 8. 
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
Columns (1) and (3) of Table 8 provide regression results for the subsample of issuer-
clients that did not receive a FV-related comment letter during our sample period, while 
Columns (2) and (4) provides results from estimating the same model on issuer-clients that did 
receive a FV-related comment letter during the fiscal year. As demonstrated in Table 8, Columns 
(1) and (3) we find a negative and significant coefficient estimate for FVA2*FVDEF and 
FVA23*FVDEF, indicating that the information uncertainty reduction documented in Table 4 
remains in the absence of comment letters. The coefficient estimates for FVA2*FVDEF and 
FVA23*FVDEF are negative and significant in Column (2) and Column (3). Therefore, despite 
the presence of comment letters, we find a negative and significant coefficient estimate 
suggesting that the PCAOB inspection process related to fair value is complementary to the 
comment letter process related to fair value.  
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7.4 Omitted Variables  
7.4.1 Quarterly Response to FV Deficient Inspection Reports 
 To provide assurance that our results are not due to an omitted variable that is correlated 
to the issuance of FV deficient inspection reports, we examine the market response to the release 
of the inspection report prior to the audit firm’s opportunity to engage the issuer client and make 
corrective actions in an audited annual report. Hence, we study the market response to fair value 
estimated asset disclosures in the quarter prior to the release of a FV deficient inspection report 
and compare it to the market response to such disclosures in the quarter after the release of the 
inspection report. Ostensibly, if PCAOB inspection reports provide information regarding poor 
audit quality, and investors are able to link auditors with potential clients, we may find evidence 
that problematic FV-estimation procedures uncovered by inspection reports induce greater 
uncertainty with respect to complex fair value estimates prior to auditors being able to intervene 
and establish better practices and enhanced disclosures.  
We gather quarterly bank data regarding fair value assets and estimate equity betas 
similarly to our main analysis but begin the estimation of returns after the quarterly earnings 
announcements that book-end the public issue of the inspection report and limit the number of 
days to 15 (rather than 3 months) after each announcement.   
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
 Table 9, Panel A, provides results of our primary model, equation (3), estimated on a 
quarterly basis and appended with quarter fixed effects. We eliminate fourth quarters from the 
analysis to prevent the influence of auditors as a mitigating factor and to avoid the inherent 
complications of other fourth quarter biases. After estimating our model pre- and post-inspection 
report issue, we apply t-tests for differences in coefficients between models. We find a positive 
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and significant difference in the coefficients for level 2 estimated assets, FVA2, suggesting that 
the implied asset-specific beta increased after the issue of the inspection report. This provides 
evidence that the issue of FV deficient inspection reports may temporarily increase information 
uncertainty associated with fair value estimates. This result also provides some assurance that 
our prior results are not due to some correlated omitted variable, unless this undocumented 
variable similarly affects the information risk captured after the issue of a FV inspection report. 
Notably, this increase corresponds to the strongest effect of our primary analysis: a subsequent 
reduction in the information uncertainty associated with FVA2 in the annual report after auditors 
are able to intervene in the reporting process.  
7.4.2 Selling Off Difficult to Estimate Fair Value Assets 
To ensure that the portfolio of fair value assets does not change after inspection reports 
(i.e. that issuer clients do not simply sell off problematic or difficult to value fair value assets 
after an inspection event), we undertake a simple analysis in the changes of fair value assets 
between years in which a FV deficient inspection report is issued and years in which no such 
report is issued. As evidenced by Table 9, Panel B, only the change in FVA2 is statistically 
significant. This indicates that issuer clients reduce their exposure to level 2 assets after the 
public issuance of a PCAOB inspection report with a fair value deficiency, but only by 0.45% as 
compared to the change in this portfolio in years that there is no deficient inspection. 
7.5 Alternative Measure of Information Uncertainty 
Following the literature in finance (Morck, Yeung and Yu 2000; Jin and Myers 2006) as 
well as Reidl and Serafeim (2011), we decompose the dependent variable of our main analysis, 
BETA_ADJ, into two components: 
𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎 =  𝜌𝑖𝑚 ∙
𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖
𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚
 
(6) 
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Where Beta is the single-factor estimate from the CAPM model used to compute BETA_ADJ, 
𝜌𝑖𝑚 represents the correlation between the daily returns of each issuer and the value-weighted 
market return in the 30 days following the release of annual reports, and 
𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑖
𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑚
 represents the 
standard deviation of issuer returns in the 30 days following the release of annual reports scaled 
by the standard deviation of the value-weighted return over a similar time frame. We multiply 
each component by the ratio of the book value of equity to total assets, similar to our 
construction of the BETA_ADJ variable, to obtain the variables CORR_ADJ and STD_ADJ. We 
perform this decomposition because CORR_ADJ is more likely to be associated with information 
risk components than STD_ADJ, which captures other fundamental risk of movements in beta. 
We run each as a dependent variable in our main regression analysis and present results in Table 
10. 
[INSERT TABLE 10 HERE] 
 Column (1) of Table 10 presents regression results with CORR_ADJ as the dependent 
variable and FVA2 and FVA3 estimated separately. We find evidence that the coefficient of 
FVA2*FVDEF is negative and significant, providing some assurance that the reduction in 
BETA_ADJ documented in prior tables is due to information risk rather than some other 
fundamental risk. The regression coefficient for FVA3*FVDEF is negative but insignificant. In 
Column (2) of Table 10, we report regression estimation with STD_ADJ as the dependent 
variable with FVA2 and FVA3 separately estimated. In this estimation, we find the regression 
coefficient of FVA2*FVDEF is negative and insignificant and the regression coefficient of 
FVA3*FVDEF is negative and significant, indicating that reductions in risk associated with level 
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3 assets after the issuance of a deficient inspection report may be due to factors other than 
information risk.  
 Columns (3) and (4) of Table 10 report results from estimating our regression with 
CORR_ADJ and STD_ADJ, respectively, with FVA2 and FVA3 estimated together. The results of 
these estimations suggest that the regression coefficient for FVA23*FVDEF is negative and 
significant when regressed on CORR_ADJ but negative and insignificant when regressed on 
STD_ADJ. The results in Columns (3) and (4) corroborate our hypothesis that reductions in fair 
value estimates association with risk are most likely due to reductions in information risk rather 
than other sources of risk, especially when managerial incentives are minimized by combining 
level 2 and level 3 fair value assets into a single variable as in Column (4) (Botosan et al. 2011). 
7.6 Alternative Measures of Fair Value Deficiency  
Because we choose the public issuance of the inspection report for our main analysis, to 
the extent that audit firms learn of the event prior to the public issuance (which is quite likely the 
case) our choice of event biases against our results in the main analysis. Therefore, we alter the 
timing aspect of the definition of our FVDEF variable from the public issuance of the inspection 
report to the end of the inspection work as reported by the inspection team. More specifically, we 
define three alternative variables: (1) INSPECT, which takes the value of 1 if a fair value 
deficient inspection report is issued prior to the fiscal year end of the issuer client, (2) 
INSPECTNUM which is the accumulated number of FV deficient inspection reports received 
since the beginning of the sample period; and (3) FVNUM, which is the proportion of the number 
of fair value deficiencies (rather than number of fair value deficient issuers) to total deficiencies 
broached in an inspection report or zero in a non-report year. To the extent that more fair value 
deficiencies (INSPECTNUM) or the proportion of fair value deficiencies discussed in the entire 
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report (FVNUM) capture a more severe report, we might expect auditors to respond with more 
effort and scrutiny directed at level 2 and level 3 fair value assets. Or to the extent that intensity 
of FV deficiencies does not play as crucial a role, INSPECT may play a more prominent effect 
than FVDEF. Thus, these constructs of FV deficient inspection reports may be more powerful 
proxies. Table 11 shows that using these alternate definitions of FVDEF do not influence our 
results, as the interaction term FVA23*FVDEF is negative and significant, as in our main results. 
[INSERT TABLE 11 HERE] 
8 Conclusions 
Estimates of fair value remain a troublesome aspect for auditors, regulators and the 
companies that disclose them. Recent efforts by the PCAOB to draw new standards of guidance 
in the auditing of assets and liabilities reported by this method stand as testament to the 
incomplete and still-evolving landscape in this area. Our study addresses the information risk 
posed by these complex fair value instruments and the role of regulators and auditors in 
assuaging those risks for the investing public.  
Our results suggest that PCAOB inspection reports that contain fair value deficiencies 
mitigate some information risk in reporting the most opaque designation of fair value 
estimates—those assessed by level 2 and level 3 inputs. We find that issuer clients that present 
the most high-risk exposure issues to their auditor exhibit the highest reduction in uncertainty 
following the issue of a FV deficient inspection report, suggesting auditors direct their scarce 
resources to clients that are most likely affected by the deficiencies. 
Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity analyses. First, in an effort to ensure the 
information risk reduction is due to auditors responding with increased scrutiny and testing 
procedures, we find decreased transfers into level 3 assets and increased audit fees after a FV 
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deficient report. Second, we find increased disclosure in the fair value footnote disclosure (more 
words and more fair value asset and liability categories) after a deficient report. Third, we find 
that our results—a reduction in information risk risk— are both complementary and incremental 
to FV-related comment letters issued by the SEC. This result suggests that the PCAOB plays an 
important role in regulating the application and dissemination of relevant FV information that 
reduces uncertainty in the financial markets. Finally, our results are robust to alternative 
measures of PCAOB deficiencies and information uncertainty.  
Overall, our study provides evidence that the regulatory mechanism of PCAOB 
inspection reports aids in reducing the information risk associated with fair value estimates. 
These findings extend prior work by Acito et al. (2017), Aobdia (2018) and DeFond and Lennox 
(2017) that examine how the content of PCAOB inspection reports influence audit quality. Our 
study also contributes to the growing literature that examines the auditor’s role in evaluating and 
providing positive assurance for fair value estimates (e.g. Glover et al. 2017; Griffith 2015; 
Griffith et al. 2015; Bedard and Cannon 2017; Christensen et al. 2013; Christensen et al. 2012). 
A recurring question in this work is whether auditors are able to provide assurance at the level 
expected by the PCAOB in auditing fair value estimates. On this dimension, we provide some 
initial evidence that the PCAOB’s efforts through inspection reports are effective in reducing the 
information uncertainty surrounding these estimates.  
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Appendix   
Variable Definitions 
 
Inspection Event Variables 
FVDEF the ratio of fair value deficient issuers listed in an inspection report to the total issuers 
listed in an inspection report 
Information Uncertainty Reduction Analysis Variables 
BETA_ADJ equity beta as assessed in the 30 days after the release of annual financial statements, 
multiplied by the ratio of equity to total assets 
FVA1 fair value of assets designated at level 1 scaled by total assets 
FVA2 fair value of assets designated at level 2 scaled by total assets 
FVA3 fair value of assets designated at level 3 scaled by total assets 
FVA23 fair value of assets designated at levels 2 and 3 scaled by total assets 
NFVA other assets not measured at fair value scaled by total assets 
LEV total liabilities scaled by total assets 
Transfer Test Variables 
LN_TRANSFERS the natural log of net transfers if positive and zero otherwise 
LN_NFVA the natural log of non-fair value assets 
LN_FVA123 the natural log of fair value assets designated as level 1, 2 and 3 
CHG_ASSET percent growth in assets over the year 
MTB the market to book ratio of the issuer client at the beginning of the year 
TCAP the total risk-based capital ratio of the bank issuer client at the beginning of the year 
SIFI an indicator variable set to 1 if the bank qualifies as a “significantly important 
financial institution (assets > $50 billion) and zero otherwise 
BIG 4 an indicator variable set to 1 if the audit firm retained by the issuer client is a member 
of the Big 4 and zero otherwise 
Sensitivity Analysis Variables 
WORDCOUNT number of words disclosed in the issuer’s fair value footnote 
ASSET_CAT number of fair value asset categories disclosed in issuer’s fair value footnote 
LIAB_CAT number of fair value liability categories disclosed in issuer’s fair value footnote 
CORR_ADJ the correlation of each issuer’s return with the value-weighted market return for the 
30 days following the release of public reports 
STD_ADJ the standard deviation of each issuer’s return divided by the standard deviation of the 
value-weighted market return for the 30 days following the release of public reports 
INSPECT a dichotomous variable coded 1 if a fair value deficient inspection was issued during 
the fiscal year and 0 otherwise 
INSPECTNUM the accumulated number of fair value deficient inspections received since the 
beginning of the sample period 
FVNUM the ratio of the number of fair value deficiencies contained in an inspection report  to 
the total deficiencies contained in the report 
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Audit Fee Variables 
LnAFEES the natural-log-transformed value of audit fees 
LnASSET the natural-log-transformed value of total assets 
LOSS a dichotomous variable coded 1 for issuers with net income less than 0, 0 otherwise 
STDRET firm-specific standard deviation of 12 monthly returns ending at the fiscal year-end 
TRANSACCT total transaction accounts divided by total deposits 
SECURITIES [1-(total securities/total assets)] 
EFFICIENCY total operating expenses divided by total revenue 
COMMLOAN the sum of commercial and agricultural loans divided by gross loans 
NONPERFORM nonperforming loans divided by gross loans 
CHGOFF net charge-offs divided by the loan loss reserve 
MTGLOAN total domestic real estate and home equity loans divided by gross loans 
CAPRATIO total risk-adjusted capital ratio 
INTANG intangible assets divided by total assets 
SENSITIVE (rate-sensitive assets – rate-sensitive liabilities)/total assets 
SAVING dichotomous variable coded 1 if the company is a savings institution (SIC codes 6035 
and 6036), and 0 otherwise 
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Table 1 Sample 
 
Panel A: Sample selection procedure 
Sample Screen N  
Number of inspection reports of US domiciled audit firms with fair value deficiencies 2008-2015 123 
Bank and nonbank issuers clients of deficient audit firms reporting positive values of level 2 and 
level 3 fair value assets 2008-2015 24,242 
Less: Nonbank issuers  21,223 
Bank issuer-years of audit firms with fair value deficiencies 2008-2015  3,019 
Less: Bank issuer-years without sufficient data for uncertainty analysis (1,386) 
Bank issuer-years of inspected audit firms with sufficient data for analysis 1,633 
Less: Bank issuer-years of triennially inspected audit firms (140) 
Bank issuer-years of annually inspected audit firms with sufficient data for uncertainty analysis 
 1,493 
 
Panel B: Frequency of fair value deficient inspection reports for annually inspected audit firms 
Year inspection ended 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
PWC 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
E&Y 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
D&T 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
KPMG 1 2 0 2 0 2 0 1 
Grant Thornton 0 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 
BDO USA 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
Malone Bailey 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
Crowe Horwath 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
McGladreyPullen/RSM 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
Total 3 8 4 9 5 9 7 5 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics and univariate tests 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for full sample and Big4/non-Big4  
  
Mean 
 
Q1 
 
Median 
 
Q3 
Standard 
Deviation 
Full Sample (All Annually Inspected Audit Firms) 
BETA_ADJ 0.111 0.057 0.111 0.155 0.079 
FVA1 0.008 0 0.001 0.004 0.022 
FVA2 0.182 0.110 0.161 0.233 0.117 
FVA3 0.004 0 0.000 0.003 0.010 
NFVA 0.805 0.881 0.898 0.913 0.042 
LEV 0.896 0.757 0.829 0.882 0.127 
FVDEF 0.226 0 0.190 0.375 0.215 
Big 4 Audit Firms Only 
BETA_ADJ 0.126 0.084 0.125 0.163 0.076 
FVA1 0.010 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.025 
FVA2 0.185 0.110 0.156 0.229 0.129 
FVA3 0.005 0 0.001 0.005 0.009 
NFVA 0.800 0.755 0.833 0.881 0.141 
LEV 0.892 0.879 0.895 0.909 0.047 
FVDEF 0.279 0.100 0.227 0.444 0.221 
Annually Inspected Non-Big 4 Audit Firms Only 
BETA_ADJ 0.083 0.024 0.076 0.130 0.078 
FVA1 0.004 0 0 0.002 0.014 
FVA2 0.179 0.112 0.171 0.238 0.093 
FVA3 0.003 0 0 0.001 0.011 
NFVA 0.814 0.758 0.824 0.882 0.095 
LEV 0.903 0.886 0.903 0.919 0.029 
FVDEF 0.133 0 0 0.318 0.168 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. BETA_ADJ = equity beta as 
assessed in the 30 days after the release of annual financial statements, multiplied by the ratio of equity to total 
assets. FVA1, FVA2, FVA3, FVA23 = fair value of assets designated at levels 1, 2, 3 and 2 and 3, respectively, 
scaled by total assets. NFVA = other assets not measured at fair value scaled by total assets. LEV = total liabilities 
scaled by total assets. FVDEF = the number of issuers with fair value deficiencies in a PCAOB inspection report 
divided by the total number of issuers listed in a PCAOB inspection report.  
 
 
Panel B: Differences of means and medians between Big 4 and annually-audited non-Big 4 
Variables Difference in Means (Big 4 – non-Big 4) 
T-statistics in parenthesis 
Difference in Medians (Big 4 – non-Big 4) 
Z-statistics in parenthesis 
BETA_ADJ 0.043*** 
(10.47) 
0.049*** 
(11.27) 
FVA1 0.006*** 
(5.43) 
0.001*** 
(10.79) 
FVA2 0.006 
(0.90) 
-0.015 
(1.35) 
FVA3 0.002*** 
(3.41) 
0.001*** 
(-8.19) 
NFVA -0.015** 
(2.05) 
0.009 
(0.11) 
LEV -0.011*** 
(4.63) 
-0.008*** 
(6.22) 
FVDEF 0.146*** 
(13.39) 
0.227*** 
(13.75) 
 
38 
 
Table 3 Correlation matrix for variables of interest (pearson coefficients above the diagonal; spearmen below the diagonal) 
 
  
BETA_AD
J 
FVA1 FVA2 FVA3 NFVA LEV FVDEF LnAFEES 
BETA_ADJ  0.030 
 
0.004 0.079*** -0.014 -0.513*** 0.073*** 0.390 
FVA1 0.215***  0.238*** 0.198*** -0.408*** 0.028 
 
-0.005 0.267*** 
FVA2 -0.001 
 
0.097***  0.254*** -0.980*** 0.078*** 0.099*** 0.228*** 
FVA3 0.186*** 
 
0.165*** 0.089***  -0.341*** 0.035 -0.001 0.399*** 
NFVA -0.013 
 
-0.203*** -0.976*** -0.136***  -0.078*** -0.092*** -0.285*** 
LEV -0.471*** 
 
-0.071*** 0.054** -0.024 -0.054**  -0.057** -0.105*** 
FVDEF 0.108*** 0.076*** 0.094*** 0.054*** -0.092*** -0.110***  
 
0.095*** 
LnAFEES 0.510*** 
 
0.379*** 0.003 0.395*** -0.042* -0.333*** 0.510***  
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. BETA_ADJ = equity beta as assessed in the 30 days after the release of annual 
financial statements, multiplied by the ratio of equity to total assets. FVA1, FVA2, FVA3, FVA23 = fair value of assets designated at levels 1, 2, 3 and 2 and 3, 
respectively, scaled by total assets. NFVA = other assets not measured at fair value scaled by total assets. LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets. DISPERSION 
= standard deviation of quarterly earnings forecast. FVA = total fair value assets scaled by total assets. FV2 = proportion of level 2 assets of total fair value assets. 
FV3 = proportion of level 3 assets of total fair value assets. LnAfees = logged audit fees in the year following the deficient inspection 
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Table 4 Information uncertainty of FV assets post-inspection 
 
Panel A: Full Sample partitioned on inclusion of fixed effects and FVA2/FVA3 treatment  
𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴_𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑖𝑡 = (𝛼1𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡) + 𝐹𝑉𝐷𝐸𝐹
+  𝐹𝑉𝐷𝐸𝐹 × (𝛼1𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼4𝑁𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
H1 
(1) 
Full Sample 
(FV2 and FV3) 
(2) 
Full Sample 
(FV2 and FV3) 
(3) 
Full Sample 
(FV23) 
(4) 
Full Sample 
(FV23) 
FVA1  0.950*** 
(5.50) 
-0.253 
(-1.15) 
0.980*** 
(5.60) 
-0.207 
(-0.91) 
FVA2  1.068*** 
(11.24) 
0.024 
(0.13) 
  
FVA3  1.346*** 
(3.66) 
0.184 
(0.57) 
 
  
FVA23    1.081*** 
(11.36) 
0.063 
(0.34) 
FVDEF  0.069*** 
(3.45) 
0.052*** 
(2.75) 
0.068*** 
(3.24) 
0.051*** 
(2.71) 
 
FVA1* FVDEF  0.788** 
(2.16) 
0.736** 
(2.12)  
0.794** 
(2.10) 
0.754** 
(2.16)  
FVA2* FVDEF - -0.263*** 
(-3.33) 
-0.271*** 
(-3.49) 
  
FVA3* FVDEF - 0.820 
(1.25) 
0.807 
(1.27) 
  
FVA23* FVDEF -   -0.234*** 
(-3.24) 
-0.241*** 
(-3.43) 
NFVA  1.001*** 
(11.64) 
-0.065 
(-0.32) 
1.007*** 
(11.61) 
-0.028 
(-0.14) 
LEV  -0.955*** 
(-10.11) 
-0.917*** 
(-9.92) 
-0.960*** 
(-10.09) 
-0.919*** 
(-9.90) 
      
Untabulated Fixed Effects Year 
Year and 
Audit firm Year 
Year and 
Audit firm 
Clustered Standard Error  By Bank By Bank By Bank By Bank 
Observations  1,493 1,493 1,493 1,493 
Adjusted R-squared  79.11% 80.92% 78.99% 80.84% 
      
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. T-statistics in parentheses. All 
tests two-tailed unless hypothesized. BETA_ADJ = equity beta as assessed in the 30 days after the release of 
annual financial statements, multiplied by the ratio of equity to total assets. FVA1, FVA2, FVA3, FVA23 = fair 
value of assets designated at levels 1, 2, 3 and 2 and 3, respectively, scaled by total assets. NFVA = other assets 
not measured at fair value scaled by total assets. LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets. FVDEF = ratio of 
fair value deficient issuers in an inspection report to the total deficient issuers in an inspection report. 
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Table 4 Information uncertainty of FV assets post-inspection (cont.) 
 
Panel B: High/low risk exposure to complex estimates partition with Fixed Effects  
𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴_𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑖𝑡 = (𝛼1𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡) + 𝐹𝑉𝐷𝐸𝐹
+  𝐹𝑉𝐷𝐸𝐹 × (𝛼1𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼4𝑁𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
 
(1) 
High Risk 
(FV2 and FV3) 
(2) 
Low Risk 
(FV2 and FV3) 
(3)  
High Risk 
(FV23) 
(4) 
Low Risk 
(FV23) 
FVA1  -0.155 
(-0.45) 
0.120 
(0.22) 
-0.094 
(-0.27) 
0.146 
(0.26) 
FVA2  0.029 
(0.10) 
0.573 
(1.18) 
  
FVA3  0.333 
(0.82) 
0.886 
(1.46) 
  
FVA23    0.073 
(0.25) 
0.610 
(1.26) 
FVDEF  0.101*** 
(3.79) 
0.016 
(0.37) 
0.096 
(3.61) 
0.023 
(0.53) 
FVA1*FVDEF  0.667 
(1.53) 
1.252** 
(2.07) 
0.661 
(1.48) 
1.188** 
(1.98) 
FVA2*FVDEF - -0.377*** 
(-4.25) 
-0.128 
(-0.44) 
  
FVA3*FVDEF - 0.500 
(0.77) 
1.945 
(1.28) 
  
FVA23*FVDEF -   -0.338*** 
(-4.19) 
-0.140 
(-0.48) 
NFVA  -0.045 
(-0.14) 
0.228 
(0.51) 
-0.009 
(-0.03) 
0.255 
(0.57) 
LEV  -1.170*** 
(-6.87) 
-0.901*** 
(-10.34) 
-1.183*** 
(-6.99) 
-0.899*** 
(-10.27) 
      
Untabulated Fixed Effects 
Year and 
Audit firm 
Year and 
Audit firm 
Year and 
Audit firm 
Year and 
Audit firm 
Clustered Standard Errors By Bank By Bank By Bank By Bank 
Observations  735 768 735 768 
Adjusted R-squared  81.44% 82.25% 81.26% 82.14% 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. T-statistics in parentheses. All tests 
two-tailed unless hypothesized. BETA_ADJ = equity beta as assessed in the 30 days after the release of annual 
financial statements, multiplied by the ratio of equity to total assets. FVA1, FVA2, FVA3, FVA23 = fair value of 
assets designated at levels 1, 2, 3 and 2 and 3, respectively, scaled by total assets. NFVA = other assets not 
measured at fair value scaled by total assets. LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets. FVDEF = ratio of fair 
value deficient issuers in an inspection report to the total deficient issuers in an inspection report. 
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Table 5 Net transfers into level 3 assets and PCAOB inspections 
 
𝐿𝑁_𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼1𝐹𝑉𝐷𝐸𝐹 + 𝛼2𝑁𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑉𝐴123𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝐶𝐻𝐺_𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼5𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑆_𝐿𝑉𝐿3𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼6𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛼8𝑆𝐼𝐹𝐼 + 𝛼9𝐵𝐼𝐺4𝑖𝑡 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
DV = Transfers as defined by Kohlbeck et al. 2017 
Tobit Model (left censored) 
INTERCEPT  -13.806*** 
(-4.26) 
FVDEF - -2.532* 
(-1.54) 
NFVA  0.993** 
(2.26) 
FVA123  0.507 
(1.60) 
CHG_ASSET  2.559 
(1.39) 
LN_TRANSFERSt-1  0.389** 
(2.40) 
MTB  -0.350 
(-0.48) 
TCAPt-1  -0.083 
(-0.93) 
SIFI  -1.436 
(-1.22) 
BIG4  -1.274* 
(-1.65) 
   
Observations  884 
Fixed Effects  Year 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. T-statistics in parentheses.  All 
tests two-tailed unless hypothesized. LN_TRANSFERS = the natural log of net transfers if positive and zero 
otherwise. LN_NFVA = the natural log of non-fair value assets. LN_FVA123 = the natural log of fair value 
assets designated as level 1, 2 and 3. CHG_ASSET = percent growth in assets over the year. MTB = the market 
to book ratio of the issuer client at the beginning of the year. TCAP = the total risk-based capital ratio of the 
bank issuer client at the beginning of the year.  SIFI = an indicator variable set to 1 if the bank qualifies as a 
“significantly important financial institution (assets > $50 billion) and zero otherwise. BIG4 = an indicator 
variable set to 1 if the audit firm retained by the issuer client is a member of the Big 4 and zero otherwise. 
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Table 6 Audit fee models 
 
𝐿𝑛𝐴𝐹𝐸𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡+1 = (𝛼1𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼4𝐹𝑉𝐷𝐸𝐹
+  𝐹𝑉𝐷𝐸𝐹 × (𝛼1𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼5𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐵𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼7𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼10𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑅𝐼𝑇𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼11𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐶𝐼𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑌
+ 𝛼12𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑀𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡+𝛼13𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀 + 𝛼14𝐶𝐻𝐺𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼15𝑀𝑇𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑡+ 𝛼16𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼17𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼18𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑆𝐼𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼18𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜖 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
(1) 
Full Sample 
(FV2 and FV3) 
(2) 
Full Sample 
(FV23) 
INTERCEPT  3.593*** 
(7.17) 
3.356*** 
(6.61) 
FVA1  -0.130 
(-0.15) 
-0.001 
(-0.00) 
FVA2 + 0.966*** 
(3.66) 
 
FVA3 + 4.364 
(1.55) 
 
FVA23 +  1.006*** 
(4.11) 
FVDEF  0.169 
(1.47) 
0.157 
(1.24) 
FVA1*FVDEF  2.260 
(0.92) 
1.424 
(0.57) 
FVA2*FVDEF + -0.684 
(-1.46) 
 
FVA3*FVDEF + 12.794** 
(1.50) 
 
FVA23*FVDEF +  -0.281 
(-0.47) 
LnASSET  0.568*** 
(27.60) 
0.584*** 
(27.33) 
BIG4  0.211** 
(2.04) 
0.197* 
(1.91) 
LOSS  0.032 
(0.54) 
0.035 
(0.59) 
STDRET  0.216 
(0.65) 
0.245 
(0.71) 
TRANSACCT  0.043 
(0.21) 
0.039 
(0.19) 
SECURITIES  0.986*** 
(3.70) 
1.033*** 
(4.01) 
EFFICIENCY  -0.024 
(-0.08) 
-0.024 
(-0.09) 
COMMLOAN  -0.649*** 
(-1.87) 
-0.697* 
(-1.93) 
NONPERFORM  3.297*** 
(2.87) 
3.345*** 
(2.96) 
CHGOFF  0.089* 
(1.91) 
0.090** 
(1.97) 
MTGLOAN  -0.471** 
(-1.99) 
-0.508** 
(-2.03) 
CAPRATIO  0.015*** 
(2.84) 
0.016*** 
(3.03) 
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INTANG  1.922 
(1.58) 
1.645 
(1.36) 
SENSITIVE  0.182 
(1.22) 
0.200 
(1.36) 
SAVING  0.041 
(0.37) 
0.041 
(0.36) 
     
Untabulated Fixed Effects Year and Audit firm Year and Audit firm 
Clustered Standard Errors By Bank By Bank 
Observations  1,336 1,336 
Adjusted R-squared  86.69% 86.47% 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. T-statistics in parentheses. All tests 
two-tailed unless hypothesized. FVA1, FVA2, FVA3, FVA23 = fair value of assets designated at levels 1, 2, 3 and 
2 and 3, respectively, scaled by total assets. LnAfees = logged audit fees in the year following the deficient 
inspection. INSPECT = 1 if fair value deficient inspection was issued prior to end of fiscal year and 0 otherwise. 
LnASSET = natural log of assets. BIG4 = 1 if the issuer employs a big-4 auditor and 0 otherwise. LOSS = 1 if net 
income is less than zero and 0 otherwise. STDRET = issuer-specific standard deviation of 12 monthly returns 
ending at the fiscal year-end. TRANSACCT = total transaction accounts divided by total deposits. SECURITIES = 
[1-(total securities/total assets)]. EFFICIENCY = total operating expenses divided by total revenue. COMMLOAN 
= the sum of commercial and agricultural loans divided by gross loans. NONPERFORM = nonperforming loans 
divided by gross loans. CHGOFF = net charge-offs divided by the loan loss reserve. MTGLOAN = total domestic 
real estate and home equity loans divided by gross loans. CAPRATIO = total risk-adjusted capital ratio. INTANG 
= intangible assets divided by total assets. SENSITIVE = (rate-sensitive assets – rate-sensitive liabilities)/total 
assets. SAVINGS = dichotomous variable coded 1 if the company is a savings institution (SIC codes 6035 and 
6036), and 0 otherwise.  
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Table 7 Fair value footnote disclosure variables 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of fair value footnote variables 
  
Mean 
 
Q1 
 
Median 
 
Q3 
Standard 
Deviation 
LN_WORD 7.809 7.465 7.820 8.167 0.577 
ASSET_CAT 7.580 5 7 9 4.911 
LIAB_CAT 1.709 0 1 2 2.155 
WORDCOUNT = log of the number of words contained in the fair value footnote of the annual report. 
ASSET_CAT = number of categories related to fair value assets measured on a recurring basis disclosed in the fair 
value footnote of the annual report. LIAB_CAT = number of categories related to fair value liabilities on a 
recurring basis disclosed in the fair value footnote of the annual report. LN_TRANSFERS = log of net transfers 
into level 3 if positive, otherwise 0. TRANSFERS = transfers in (out) of level 3 scaled by total fair value assets 
designated as level 1, level 2 and level 3. 
 
Panel B: Differences in means pre-/post-inspection for fair value footnote variables 
Variables INSPECT = 1 INSPECT = 0 Difference in means 
LN_WORD 7.824 7.562 -8.07*** 
ASSET_CAT 7.738 5.522 -7.84*** 
LIAB_CAT 1.556 1.122 -3.60*** 
 
Panel C: Differences in means High/Low FVDEF (above/below FVDEF median) 
Variables FVDEF > median FVDEF < median Difference in means 
LN_WORD 7.829 7.680 -5.15*** 
ASSET_CAT 7.759 6.529 -4.83*** 
LIAB_CAT 1.536 1.342 -1.80* 
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Table 8 SEC Comment letter analysis  
 
𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴_𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑖𝑡 = (𝛼1𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡) + 𝐹𝑉𝐷𝐸𝐹
+  𝐹𝑉𝐷𝐸𝐹 × (𝛼1𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼4𝑁𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
H1 
(1) 
No Fair Value 
Comment 
Letter 
(FV2 and FV3) 
(2) 
Fair Value 
Comment 
Letter 
(FV2 and FV3) 
(3)  
No Fair Value 
Comment 
Letter 
 (FV23) 
(4) 
Fair Value 
Comment 
Letter 
 (FV23) 
FVA1  0.012 
(0.05) 
-0.302 
(-0.90) 
0.065 
(0.30) 
-0.305 
(-0.96) 
FVA2  0.292* 
(1.72) 
-0.330 
(-1.15) 
  
FVA3  0.465 
(1.50) 
-0.291 
(-0.55) 
  
FVA23    0.336** 
(2.02) 
-0.331 
(-1.22) 
FVDEF  0.046* 
(1.95) 
0.071** 
(2.25) 
0.044* 
(1.86) 
0.072** 
(2.28) 
FVA1*FVDEF  0.703 
(1.61) 
0.322 
(0.65) 
0.726 
(1.65) 
0.323 
(0.66) 
FVA2*FVDEF - -0.269*** 
(-2.60) 
-0.240*** 
(-2.01) 
  
FVA3*FVDEF - 1.690 
(2.33) 
-0.599 
(-0.56) 
  
FVA23*FVDEF -   -0.228*** 
(-2.30) 
-0.253*** 
(-2.51) 
NFVA  0.213 
(1.19) 
-0.421 
(-1.41) 
0.254 
(1.43) 
-0.424 
(-1.49) 
LEV  -0.882*** 
(-10.00) 
-1.340*** 
(-7.86) 
-0.883*** 
(-9.99) 
-1.336*** 
(-7.92) 
      
Untabulated Fixed Effects 
Year and 
Audit firm 
Year and 
Audit firm 
Year and 
Audit firm 
Year and 
Audit firm 
Clustered Standard Errors By Bank By Bank By Bank By Bank 
Observations  1,135 358 1,135 358 
Adjusted R-squared  78.98% 88.41% 78.81% 88.41% 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. T-statistics in parentheses.  All tests 
two-tailed unless hypothesized. BETA_ADJ = equity beta as assessed in the 30 days after the release of annual 
financial statements, multiplied by the ratio of equity to total assets. FVA1, FVA2, FVA3, FVA23 = fair value of 
assets designated at levels 1, 2, 3 and 2 and 3, respectively, scaled by total assets. NFVA = other assets not 
measured at fair value scaled by total assets. LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets. FVDEF = ratio of fair 
value deficient issuers in an inspection report to the total deficient issuers in an inspection report. 
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Table 9  
 
Panel A: Quarterly test of information uncertainty and fair value assets pre-/post-inspection 
report issue 
𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴_𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑁𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖 
Variable 
Test for Coefficient 
Differences 
(t-statistic) 
(1) 
Pre-Issue Quarter 
(FV2 and FV3) 
 (2) 
Post-Issue Quarter 
(FV2 and FV3) 
FVA1 1.354 0.586* 
(1.77) 
1.117*** 
(5.33) 
FVA2 1.746** 0.496*** 
(2.38) 
0.956*** 
(5.85) 
FVA3 0.102 1.392*** 
(3.01) 
1.454*** 
(3.69) 
NFVA  0.567*** 
(2.83) 
0.948*** 
(6.11) 
LEV  -0.497** 
(-2.21) 
 
-0.823*** 
(-5.03) 
Untabulated Fixed 
Effects 
 
Quarter Quarter 
Clustered Standard 
Errors 
 
By Bank By Bank 
Observations  579 563 
Adjusted R-squared  43.38% 57.48% 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. T-statistics in parentheses. All tests 
two-tailed unless hypothesized. BETA_ADJ = equity beta as assessed in the 30 days after the release of annual 
financial statements, multiplied by the ratio of equity to total assets. FVA1, FVA2, FVA3, FVA23 = fair value of 
assets designated at levels 1, 2, 3 and 2 and 3, respectively, scaled by total assets. NFVA = other assets not 
measured at fair value scaled by total assets. LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets.  
 
 
Panel B: Changes in fair value holdings pre-/post-inspection 
Variables Mean Median 
 INSPECT = 1 INSPECT = 0 
 
Difference INSPECT = 1 INSPECT = 0 Difference 
BETA_ADJ -0.0048 -0.0162 0.0114** -0.0005 -0.0098 0.0093*** 
FVA1 0.0003 -0.0007 0.00107 0 0 0 
FVA2 -0.0045 0.0065 -0.0109*** -0.0041 0.0069 -0.0110 
FVA3 -0.0004 0.0001 0.0006 0 0 0 
NFVA 0.0045 -0.0060 0.0105** 0.0041 -0.0070 0.0111 
LEV -0.0020 -0.0014 0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0013 0.0003*** 
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Table 10 Information Uncertainty for Fair Value Assets Post-Inspection, Alternate Dependent 
Variables Specification 
 
𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅_𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑖𝑡  𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑇𝐷_𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑖𝑡
= (𝛼1𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡) + 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇
+  𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇 × (𝛼1𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼4𝑁𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖 
Variable 
(1) 
DV= CORR_ADJ 
 (FV2 and FV3) 
(2) 
DV= STD_ADJ 
(FV2 and FV3) 
(3) 
DV=CORR_ADJ 
 (FV23) 
(4) 
DV=STD_ADJ 
 (FV23) 
FVA1 -0.049 
(-0.88) 
0.173 
(0.36) 
-0.048 0.273 
(0.54) 
FVA2 0.006 
(0.11) 
0.110 
(0.27) 
  
FVA3 -0.091 
(-0.75) 
1.423** 
(2.25) 
  
FVA23   0.007 0.200 
(0.47) 
FVDEF 0.011 
(1.49) 
-0.030 
(-0.73) 
0.009 
(1.35) 
-0.022 
(-0.54) 
FVA1*FVDEF 0.335** 
(2.83) 
-0.264 
(-0.33) 
0.116**  -0.426 
(-0.55) 
FVA2*FVDEF -0.089*** 
(2.83) 
0.045 
(0.30) 
  
FVA3*FVDEF 0.736*** 
(2.80) 
-5.153*** 
(-3.79) 
  
FVA23*FVDEF   -0.067** 
(-2.31) 
-0.098 
(-0.70) 
NFVA -0.024 0.271 -0.019 
(-0.34) 
0.256 
(0.56) 
LEV -0.270*** -4.467*** -0.272*** 
(-3.84) 
-4.450*** 
(-6.96) 
     
Untabulated Fixed 
Effects 
Year and 
Audit firm 
Year and 
Audit firm 
Year and 
Audit firm 
Year and 
Audit firm 
Clustered Standard 
Errors 
By Bank By Bank By Bank By Bank 
Observations 1,493 1,493 1,493 1,493 
Adjusted R-squared 83.68% 84.17% 83.60% 84.16% 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. T-statistics in parentheses. All tests 
two-tailed unless hypothesized. CORR_ADJ = correlation between daily bank-issuer returns and daily value-
weighted market return in the 30 days after the release of annual financial statements, multiplied by the ratio of 
equity to total assets. STD_ADJ = standard deviation of daily bank-issuer returns scaled by the standard deviation 
of daily value-weighted market returns in the 30 days after the release of annual financial statements, multiplied 
by the ratio of equity to total assets. FVA1, FVA2, FVA3, FVA23 = fair value of assets designated at levels 1, 2, 3 
and 2 and 3, respectively, scaled by total assets. NFVA = other assets not measured at fair value scaled by total 
assets. LEV = total liabilities scaled by total assets. INSPECT = 1 if fair value deficient inspection was issued 
prior to end of fiscal year and 0 otherwise.  
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Table 11 Alternate specifications of inspection event variable 
 
𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴_𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑖𝑡 = (𝛼1𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡) + 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑉𝐴𝑅
+  𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑉𝐴𝑅 × (𝛼1𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴2𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑎𝐹𝑉𝐴3𝑖𝑡) + 𝛼4𝑁𝐹𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
H1 
(1) 
INSPECTVAR = 
INSPECT 
(2) 
INSPECTVAR = 
INSPECTNUM 
(3) 
INSPECTVAR = 
FVNUM 
FVA1  -0.29 
(-1.17) 
-0.084 
(-0.34) 
-0.205 
(-0.92) 
FVA23  0.090 
(0.49) 
0.042 
(0.23) 
0.062 
 (0.34) 
INSPECTVAR  0.012** 
(2.03) 
0.007 
(1.50 
0.039** 
(2.43) 
FVA1* FVDEF  0.339** 
(2.39) 
0.591 
(0.53) 
0.198** 
(1.59) 
FVA23* FVDEF - -0.079*** 
(-3.35) 
-0.039* 
(-1.93) 
-0.159*** 
(-2.58) 
NFVA  -0.007*** 
(-0.03) 
-0.023 
(-0.11) 
-0.018*** 
(-0.09) 
LEV  -0.918*** 
(-9.86) 
-0.917*** 
(-9.83) 
-0.917*** 
(-9.86) 
      
Untabulated Fixed Effects 
 
Year and  
Audit firm 
Year and 
Audit firm 
Year and  
Audit firm 
Clustered Standard Error  
By Bank By Bank 
By Bank 
 
Observations  1,493 1,493 1,493 
 
Adjusted R-squared  80.75% 80.66% 80.77% 
 
      
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. T-statistics in parentheses. All 
tests two-tailed unless hypothesized. INPSECT = 1 if an auditor received a fair value deficient inspection 
report during the fiscal year and 0 otherwise. INSPECTNUM = total number of fair value deficient inspections 
received by an auditor during the sample period to date. FVNUM = number of fair value deficiencies in an 
inspection report divided by the total number of deficiencies in an inspection report. BETA_ADJ = equity beta 
as assessed in the 30 days after the release of annual financial statements, multiplied by the ratio of equity to 
total assets. FVA1, FVA2, FVA3, FVA23 = fair value of assets designated at levels 1, 2, 3 and 2 and 3, 
respectively, scaled by total assets. NFVA = other assets not measured at fair value scaled by total assets. LEV 
= total liabilities scaled by total assets. FVDEF = ratio of fair value deficient issuers in an inspection report to 
the total deficient issuers in an inspection report. 
 
